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THE PROBABLE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF
INSERTING PRICE-INDEX CLAUSES IN
LONG-TERM CORPORATE
OBLIGATIONS
By GOBDON E. McCnwurocK*
INFLATION has been described as a general abundance of available
cash, enhancing prices continually over a period of time.1 The United
States has been engulfed in a continuing spiral of such inflation since
the onset of World War II.2 It is general knowledge that inflation
bears most heavily on those with fixed incomes. The fixed income
group includes annuitants, pensioners, wage earners, and those re-
ceiving income from long-term obligations such as corporate and
muicipal bonds or long-term promissory notes upon which interest
is payable over a period of years with the principal being repayable
in installments or at maturity in the same sum as was originally in-
vested.
It is the purpose of this comment to explore the probable legal
consequences of inserting price-mdex clauses in corporate bonds
and long-term promissory notes as a method of protecting investors
buying such fixed income and principal obligations from depreciation
in the value of money Basically, such a clause would provide that
the principal obligation increase at a rate commensurate with the
increase in a stipulated price-index during the term of the obligation,
with the interest due being computed on the increased value of the
obligation at a fixed reference date during each interest period.
Some fixed income groups are already protected by such clauses.
0 Member, Third Year Class.
1 NUSSBAUM , MONEY IN THE LAw NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 192 (rev. ed.
1950).
2 In 1940, the money stock of the United States, in millions of dollars, was 28,458,
of which 7,848 was in circulation. By 1965 the money stock had increased to 59,659 and
circulating currency to 42,056. U.S. D 'T oF CoMMEmcE, BUrAu oF CENsus, STATiSTI-
CAL ABSTRAcT OF =HE UNrrED STATEs 447 (1966). The purchasing power of the dollar,
with the 1957-1959 period equalling a base of $1.00, has decreased from $2.048 in 1940
to $ .910 I 1965 as measured by consumer commodities; and from $2.326 to $ .976
during the same period as measured by wholesale commodities. Id. at 351. Similarly, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI) which measures changes in
the cost of items important to urban wage earners and clerical workers, increased from
an index of 48.4 in 1939, to 112.0 in March, 1966. Id. at 356. A similar increase has
occurred in the Wholesale Price Index compiled by the same agency during the same
period. Id. at 351.
3 Prce-ndex clauses are alternatively denominated as "escalator clauses," "sliding-
scale clauses," and "inflation provisions."
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Wage contracts often use one of several forms4 of escalator provisions
in order to protect the employee against cost-of-living increases.'
Some pension plans also employ such a provision.6 Other less frequent
uses of price-index clauses are in insurance7 and annuity contracts,
alimony and property settlement agreements, royalty agreements,
welfare plans and long-term leases. 8 Some savings and loan associa-
tions employ a form of escalator clause which allows an increase in
the interest rate without affecting the amount of the principal obliga-
tionY
Despite Jundical adherence to the nominal value theory of
money,"° there has been an increased public awareness of index
4 Adjusting Wages to Living Costs Under Contracts, 5 L.R.R.M. 1032-33 (1940).
Wage agreements may provide for the reopemng of negotiations upon the occurrence of
a stipulated increase in a particular index, or occasionally for automatic increases com-
mensurate with the change in the cost-of-living. Ibid. Standard cost-of-living wage ad-
justment clauses appear in CCH, UNION CoNTrcT CLAusEs fIlt 51309-13 (1954).
5 Short discussions of the use of such clauses in labor contracts appear in: Bachman,
Cost-of-Living Escalator Clauses-Here and Abroad, 10 LAB. L.J. 615 (1959); Johnson,
Are Cost-of-Livmng Escalator Clauses Inflationary?, 11 LAB. L.J. 891 (1960); Two-Way
Escalator Clause in Oil Contract, 19 L.R.R.M. 33 (1946); Livmng-Cost Data for Bargain-
ing, 17 L.R.R.M. 2517 (1946); Study of Cost-of-Livnng Clauses, 10 L.R.R.M. 1213
(1942).
6 1 P-H 1966 PENsxoN Am hor S AcriuG It 2161, at 2121-23 (1965). For a model
cost-of-living provision for a pension plan, see id. II 30,216 (1958).
7 The use of such clauses is inpractical in insurance contracts, banking and public
utilities because the fixed corporate income is not variable with the corresponding obliga-
tion to pay as required by an index clause. Call, Money and the Sliding Scale Clause in
Contracts, 24 Mo. L. Rv. 44, 49 (1959); Dawson & Coultrap, Contracting by Reference
to Price Indices, 33 Mici. L. REv. 685, 702 (1935).
8 See Dach, Validity of Price-Index Clauses Under the Cold Coin Joint Resolution,
13 GEo. WASH. L. Rxv. 328 (1945); CCH 1966 LAB. L. REE'. (3 Lab. Rels.) t 7760.10,
7770.01.
9 Newsweek, Oct. 17, 1966, p. 80.
Prudential Savings and Loan Association uses a promissory note which provides
that "on or after six months from date, on three months written notice to the obligor, the
holder may increase the above interest rate by a maximum of Y of 1% per annum
by which Prudential has increased the interest rate payable to its certificate holders
on investment certificate accounts over the now existing rate " Letter From Robert
J. Elliott, Prudential Savings and Loan Association, San Gabriel, California, to Gordon
E. McClintock, Dec. 13, 1966, with copy of above note included.
1o NusSBAUM, op. cit. supra note 1, at 28, 30, 171-74. In United States courts the
nominal value theory of money dominates over other theories of money. The nominalistic
principal means that a monetary obligation involves the payment of so many chattels
which are legal tender at the time of payment and which, if added together according
to the nominal value indicated thereon, produce a sum equal to the amount of the debt
regardless of both their intrinsic and functional value. MAsN, THE LE AL, AsPECT OF
MoNEY 69 (1953). The term intrinsic value refers to the actual value of the token's in-
gredients, or the actual value of what the token may be exchanged for in terms of silver
or gold. The functional value refers to the money's ability to purchase commodities on
some market. Ibid.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
May 167 CMMNT
numbers in the past sixty to seventy years.' An index number is a
measure of the purchasing power of money;' 2 it represents the average
percentage change in the prices of a number of representative com-
modities from one point of time to another.13 If the parties to a
contract for the payment of money wish to protect themselves against
changes in monetary value they often contract in reference to such
an index, 14 or use some other means of protecting against price
change.' The index chosen for such a clause should correspond to
the particular needs of the parties.16 Thus, whereas an employee or
annuitant will be primarily interested in preserving the purchasing
power of his income in the retail market, the employer or corporate
borrower will be more interested in a measure reflecting changes in
the price of wholesale commodities. Certain other techical require-
ments in the choice of an index which should be considered in draft-
ing such a clause are amply discussed in another article.'7
Price-index clauses in corporate obligations are not entirely un-
known. The form for such an instrument was first suggested in an
experiment undertaken by Professor Irving Fisher in 1925,'8 and a
11 NUSSBAUWV Op. cit. supra note 1, at 28.
12 Iba.
13 FxsEm, TE MONEY ILLuSiON 19 (1928); see CCH 1966 LAB. L. RPi. (3 Lab.
Rels.) i 7760.
14 The use of such clauses in bonds and promissory notes, however, would appear
to be minimal despite statements to the contrary by some authors who do not give par-
ticulars. Fismm, STABrI MoNEy 388 (1934) remarks in reference to the Rand Kardex
bond, which is discussed in the text znfra, that a "few analagous types have been used
by other commercial compames." CCH 1966 LAB. L. REP. (3 Lab. Rels) 1777.01 (Em-
phasis added) states that "not so well known is the fact that numerous long-term rental
contracts, insurance policies, long term bonds, and other such contracts are geared to
changes in the Consumer Price Index." Bachman, supra note 5, at 615 (Emphasis
added) remarks that the "general increase in prices during World War II and the post-
war years has led wage earners, pensioners, bondholders and others to seek refuge in
various types of escalators." The only such instruments which this writer has been able
to discover appear in the text infra.
15 Other methods include hedging, which involves the use of a counter-balancing
transaction; cost plus contracts; target or incentive contracts; delivery price contracts
which provide that the pnce will be determined by market or cost conditions at the time
of delivery. Cunningham, The Use of Prtce Indexes tn Escalator Contracts, MoTrLxY
LABOR REv. 948 (1963). Also available from U.S. BUREAU OF LABoR STATISTICS, D.E"T
OF LABOR, REPamr No. 2424 (1963).
16 Dawson & Coultrap, supra note 7, at 692-96.
17 Id. at 690.
3S Fisher had the Rand Kardex Company of Buffalo issue bonds containing an index
clause, but they were recalled after several years when the Rand Kardex Company
merged with another company and the index clause bonds were replaced by ordinary
bonds. NussRAUN4 op. cit. supra note 1, at 305. The bond provided that the obligor
promises to pay to the holder "such sum of money as shall possess the present purchas-
ing power of one thousand dollars ($1,000) with interest thereon at the rate of seven
per cent per annum, payable quarterly in such sums as shall, at the respective times
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later instrument containing such a clause has recently been involved
in federal tax litigation in the case of Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v.
United States.19 The obligation there is in the form of a registered
pronssory note issued under permit from the California Corporations
Commission, and is apparently patterned after an "inflation provision
debenture" issued by Christiansen Corporation of Chicago, Illinois.2
The debenture recites that,
since it is the purpose of the Company to pay to the holder of this
Debenture at maturity, or any prior date of payment, and to pay
interest on, an amount in dollars equivalent to the purchasing power
of the Face Amount of June 15, 1952,21 such payments of principal
and interest shall be made in amounts which will provide
for changes in the purchasing power of the Face Amount due to
price changes as measured by changes in the "Consumer Price
Index "22
There is a similar recital in the Utility Trailer Company note.
In both the Utility Trailer Company note and the Christiansen
Corporation debenture, the obligor promises to pay a sum of money
called the "Maturity Value," with interest payments to be computed
on the "Prepayment Value." The actual consideration for the issue
of the instrument is called the "Face Amount." The "Maturity Value"
of these instruments is stipulated to be a minmum of 100% of the
Face Amount.23 It is to be computed by "multiplying the Face Amount
by a factor obtained by dividing the Index Number for the
year the instrument becomes due by the Base Index, 24 such factor to
be determined to the nearest one-hundredth."25 The "Prepayment
of payment, equal in purchasing power one and seventy-five one-hundredths per cent
(1.75%) of said purchasing power of one thousand dollars ($1,000) all to be based
upon an index number of the prices of commodities " The Annalist, Nov. 13, 1925,
p. 603. The index employed was that of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for whole-
sale prices. Id. at 604.
19 212 F Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
20 The opinion in the Utility Trailer case, supra note 19, at 778, states that the
promissory note therein involved was based upon a similar debenture issued by a
Chicago firm. The Christiansen debenture and the Utility Trailer note are almost iden-
tical in language.
21 The date recited is the date of issue.
22 Chnstiansen Plan-Inflation Provision Debenture, Chicago, Illinois, July 1, 1952.
The applicable provisions of the instrument are reproduced in Appendix A.
23The Christiansen debenture provides that the maximum increase will be up to
150% of the face amount. The Utility instrument omits this provision, thereby leaving
the door open to financial disaster in case of excessive inflation.
24The "Base Index" is the CPI number on the date of issue or on a stipulated date
during the year of issue.
25 Christiansen Plan-Inflation Provision Debenture, Chicago, Illinois, July 1, 1952,
as reproduced in Appendix A.
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Value" of the mstrument, which is the measure for interest computa-
tion, is stipulated to be at least 100% of the Face Amount2 6 and is
to be determined annually in the same manner as the Maturity Value.
27
The above discussion indicates the basic problem and the solution
reached by some. The remainder of tins paper will discuss specific
problems raised by the use of index clauses.
Gold Clauses and the 1933 Joint Resolution 8
Prior to 1933, gold clauses were widely used as a means of protect-
ing the obligee of a contract for the payment of money from deprecia-
tion in the value of currency It is estimated that before 1933, gold
The instruments also provide for the mechanics of computation in the event that
the Consumer Price Index is discontinued or there is a substantial change m the method
of its compilation. This is an essential term because there would be no method of
computation if a change were made in the absence of such a provision. The debenture
provides that m the event a new index (also meaning a basic change in the present
index) is promulgated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the BLS or its successor
agency will be asked to supply a conversion table. The BLS finding shall be conclusive
on both parties. If the CPI is discontinued, the Maturity Value and the Prepayment
Value are to remain unchanged from and as of the last date that the CPI is published
for the duration of the obligation. The Utility note also provides that the BLS shall be
asked for a conversion table, but if it is not forthcoming, or the index is discontinued, a
named third party shall determine the value of the obligation at the expense of the
obligor. If the third party fails to determine the value, the amounts are to be frozen as
above, on the last date the CPI is published.
26 The Christiansen debenture provides that the maximum figure on which interest
may be computed is 150% of the Face Amount. The Utility note omits this provision.
27 See Appendix B for an example of the computations under this formula.
28 Extensie literature about gold clauses and the Joint Resolution was written in
the 1930's: Barry, Gold, 20 VA. L. REv. 263 (1934); Carpenter, The Gold Clause Cases,
8 So. CAL. L. REv. 181 (1935); Collier, Gold Contracts and Currency Regulation, 23
CoRNELL L.Q. 520 (1938); Collier, Gold Contracts and Legislative Power, 2 GEo. WAsH.
L. REv. 303 (1934); Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions, 33 Mica. L. REv. 647 (1935);
Dickinson, The Gold Decisions, 83 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (1935); Eder, The Gold Clause
Cases in the Light of History, 23 GEo. L.J. 359 (1935); Glass, Constitutional Validity of
the "Gold Clause" Cases, 7 Miss. L.J. 419 (1935); Hanna, Federal Currency Restrictions
and Gold Contracts, 19 A.B.A.J. 349 (1933); Hanna, Currency Control and Private
Property, 33 CoLum. L. REv. 617 (1933); Hart, The Gold Clause in United States
Bonds, 48 HAnv. L. REv. 1057 (1935); King, The Gold Clause--Can it Constitutionally
be Abrogated by LegtslationP, 2 Gxo. WAsH. L. REv. 131 (1934); MacLean, Outline of
the Gold Clause Cases, 15 N.C.L. REv. 249 (1937); Nebolsme, The Gold Clause in Pri-
vate Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 1051 (1933); Nussbaum, Comparative and International
Aspects of American Gold Clause Abrogation, 44 YALE L.J. 53 (1934); Payne, The Gold
Clause in Corporate Mortgages, 20 A.B.A.J. 370 (1934); Post & Willard, The Power of
Congress to Nullify Gold Clauses, 46 HxAv. L. REv. 1225 (1933); Storke, Monetary
Legislation and the Gold Clause, 6 Rocx MT. L. REv. 237 (1934); Note, Economic
and Legal Aspects of the "Gold Clause" Dilemma, 1 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 493 (1933);
Note, Effect of Gold Clauses Under Recent Legislation, 29 ILL. L. REv. 655 (1935).
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obligations in this country totalled more than one hundred billion
dollars.29 The typical American gold clause provided that the obligor
would pay X dollars "in gold corn of the United States of . [or
equal to] the standard of weight and fineness existing on "the
date of contracting 0 This clause was held to imply a secondary
promise to pay the equivalent value in currency if gold corn became
unavailable for paymenta 1 Until 1933 these clauses were valid and
fully enforceable. The clause was held not to render the istrument
non-negotiable at common law,82 or under the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law.8
In 1933, the Seventy-Third Congress, by joint resolution, abrogated
the use of gold clauses in domestic contracts.3 4 Although there are no
cases in point, commentators are unanimous in the view that the
1933 Joint Resolution should not be held to invalidate pnce-mdex
clauses. 5 This conclusion is based upon two reasons: (1) the first
sentence of the Resolution is patently inapplicable to an index clause
2 9 
NUSSBAUm, Moray iN THE LAw NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL 226 (rev. ed.
1950).
30 Id. at 229.
3 1 Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1934); Feist v. Soci6t6 Intercom-
munale Beige d'Electncit6, [1934] A.C. 161 (1933), reversing, [1933] 1 Ch. 684 (1933).
3 2 Eastman v. Sunset Park Land Co., 35 Cal. App. 628, 170 Pac. 642 (1917);
Chrysler v. Renois, 43 N.Y. 209 (1870); Wright v. Morgan, 37 S.W 627 (Tex. Civ. App.
1896).
3 3 The UNiFoRm NEGoTIALE INSTRumENTS LAw § 6(5) provides that the validity
or negotiable character of an instrument is not affected by the fact "that it designates a
particular kind of current money in which payment is to be made." Note, however, that
a clause calling for payment in gold bullion would render an instrument non-negotiable
because it was construed as calling for payment in a commodity. Roberts v. Smith, 58
Vt. 492, 4 Ad. 709 (1886); Nebolsme, The Gold Clause in Private Contracts, 42 YA.E
L.J. 1051, 1090 (1933).
3448 Stat. 112 (1933), 31 U.S.C. § 463 (1958). The essential provisions are as
follows: "(a) Every provision contained in or made with respect to any obligation
which purports to give the obligee a right to require payment in gold or a particular
kind of coin or currency, or in an amount in money of the United States measured
thereby, is declared to be against public policy; and no such provision shall be made
with respect to any obligation hereafter incurred. Every obligation, heretofore or hereafter
incurred, whether or not any such provision is contained therein or made with respect
thereto, shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency
which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private debts (b)
As used in this resolution, the term 'obligation" means an obligation payable in
money of the United States; and the term 'cor or currency' means coin or currency of
the United States "
35 NussBAtM, MoNEY 3x ThE LAw NATIONAL AND INTERNATONAL 307 (rev. ed.
1950); Call, Money and the Sliding Scale Clause in Contracts, 24 Mo. L. REV. 44
(1959); Dach, Validity of Price-Index Clauses Under the Gold Coin Joint Resolution,
13 GEO. WAsxr. L. REv. 328 (1945); Dawson, The Gold Clause Decisions, 33 McH. L.
REV. 647, 683 (1935); Dawson & Coultrap, Contracting by Reference to Price Indices,
33 MicH. L. REv. 685 (1935); Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index Clauses, 84
U. PA. L. REv. 569 (1936).
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because an index clause is not predicated upon "gold or a particular
kind of corn or currency" nor upon "an amount of money of the United
States measured thereby";38 and (2) the second sentence of the
Resolution must be read in con]unction with the first sentence. 37 The
wording of the second sentence of the Resolution is sufficient to in-
validate a price-mdex clause if literally construed. It provides that
"every obligation shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for
dollar, in any corn or currency which at the time of payment is legal
tender for public and private debts."38 Under the nominal value
theory of money, and construing the increase on an index clause
obligation to be principal rather than interest, if the debtor is required
to pay one hundred and fifty dollars to discharge an original indebted-
ness of one hundred dollars, the debt has not been discharged upon
payment, "dollar for dollar." However, authority for construing the
two sentences together is found in some of the better reasoned
multiple currency cases39 decided under the Resolution where clauses
providing that the obligor pay X number of dollars in one of several
alternative currencies have been upheld.40 These courts have realized
that the "dollar for dollar" language can "have but one meaning: if
an obligation is payable in any particular kind of corn or currency,
the debt may be discharged in any corn or currency that is legal
tender."41 If the latter construction is placed upon the Resolution an
index clause would be valid because in the case of an index clause
obligation there is no particular corn or currency that can be con-€€ 42
verted "dollar for dollar" into legal tender.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the policy behind the 1933
36 Dach, supra note 35, at 332; NJssSBAuM, MONEY IN Tm LAw NATIONAL AND
INmNATONAL 307 (rev. ed. 1950).
37 Dach, supra note 35, at 332.
38 48 Stat. 112 (1933), 31 U.S.C. 493 (1958).
39 Dach, supra note 35, at 331-36; Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index
Clauses, 84 U. PA. L. REv. 569, 573-75 (1936). The following cases held that the Joint
Resolution did not invalidate multiple currency clauses: Anglo-Continentale Treuhand,
A.G. v. St. Louis So. W By., 81 F.2d 11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 655 (1936);
McAdoo v. Southern Pac. By., 10 F Supp. 953 (N.D. Cal. 1935), rev'd. on other
grounds, 82 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1936); Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Co., 279 N.Y. 495, 18 N.E.2d 673 (1939); Lann v. United Steel Works Corp., 166
Misc. 465, 1 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1938). Contra, Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 98 F.2d
160 (8th Cir. 1938), aff'd, 307 U.S. 247 (1939); Zurich Gen. Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Lackawanna Steel Co., 164 Misc. 498, 299 N.Y. Supp. 862, aff'd sub nom. Zurich Gen.
Ace. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 254 App. Div. 839, 6 N.Y.S.2d 139 (1938);
Anglo-Continentale Treuhand, A.G. v. Southern Pac. Ry., 165 Misc. 562, 299 N.Y. Supp.
859 (1936); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 244 App. Div. 634,
280 N.Y. Supp. 494 (1935).
40 For example: I promise to pay to the order of B, X number of dollars in the
United States in gold, or in England, in pounds sterling, or in Germany, in gold marks.
41 Dach, supra note 35, at 332.
421d. at 333.
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Joint Resolution was to remove the depressing effect upon the econ-
omy caused by requiring a debtor to pay $1.69 m currency upon a
$1.00 debt while still receiving taxes, rates, charges or prices at a basis
of $1.00 of that currency43 A debtor cannot easily afford to pay a
debt at an increased amount when his income remains the same.
Professor Dach believes that the use of index clauses is not viola-
tive of tis policy because an index clause floats with the general
level of prices, whereas the price of gold is arbitrary and does not
necessary reflect changes in the. business or economic life of the debtor
or creditor.44 He states that neither creditor nor debtor can gain or
lose as a result of such a clause because it merely eliminates the
discrepancy between nominal and real value.45 Professor Nussbaum
disagrees in part, contending that such clauses do bear heavily upon
the debtor by placing the whole burden of compensating for monetary
depreciation upon his shoulders, although the burden may not be as
great as under a gold clause because price indexes have a more direct
relationship to the interests of the parties.46
There has been some indication that government policy is against
the use of index clauses, 47 although the text of the statute and the
records of the debates48 and Committee Reports49 in Congress indicate
that only gold clauses were intended to be expressly affected. More-
over, index- clauses have been in general use for various purposes
since the passage of the Joint Resolution.50 Still, doubts as to the
effect of the Resolution upon index clauses must remain until some
court has definitively spoken upon the question. It would also seem
that there is more than the normal threat of new legislation to abro-
4 3 Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 311-16 (1934).
44 Dach, supra note 35, at 337-39.
45 Id. at 337.
46 NUSSBAU, MONEY IN THE LAw NATIONAL AND INTERATIONAL 306 (rev. ed.
1950). There is also some disagreement as to whether the use of index clauses is in-
flationary. Compare Johnson, Are Cost-of-Lzvtng Escalator Clauses Inflationary?, 11
LAB. L.J. 891 (1960), with NusSBAUM, supra at 306 and Bachman, Cost-of-Lioing
Escalator Clauses-Here and Abroad, 10 LAB. L.J. 615 (1959).
47 The preamble to the Joint Resolution states that gold clauses are "inconsistent
with the declared policy of the Congress to maintain at all times the equal power of
every dollar, corned or issued by the United States, in the markets and in the payment
of debts." 48 Stat. 112 (1933). See, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, Mone-
tary Policy and Management of the Public Debt, S. Doc. No. 123, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
142-45, 888, 1097-114 (1952).
4877 CoNe. REc. 4404, 4452, 4519-27, 4528-63, 4846, 4889-929, 5055, 5197
(1933).
49 H.R. REP. No. 169, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933); S. REP. No. 99, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1933).
50 NUSSBAUM, MoNEY iN =sn LAw NATIONAL AND INTEBNATIONAL 307 (rev. ed.
1950) points out that the United States itself used such a clause in an agreement with
Cuba to purchase sugar in 1945.
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gate such clauses if they mature into general use in debt obligations.
Unless a maximum -value provision were inserted in index clause
obligations, heavy inflation would place a debtor in substantially the
same position he would have been in under a gold clause before the
remedial legislation abrogating its use.
Negotiability Under Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
Although gold clauses were held not to impair negotiability, 51
there has been general agreement by writers that the insertion of a
price-index clause in an instrument otherwise negotiable would
render the sum uncertain and the instrument non-negotiable under
the law prior to the Uniform Commercuzil Code . 2 The negotiability of
gold clause obligations was predicated upon a ground wholly map-
plicable to index provisions. Section 6(5) of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Law provided that the negotiable character of an instru-
ment would not be affected by the designation of "a particular kind
of current money in which payment is to be made." Gold clauses fell
within this provision. 3
The Uniform Commercial Code in section 3-10454 contains the
same basic requirement for a sun certain as did the Uniform Negotia-
ble Instruments Law. Section 3-10655 of the Uniform Commercial
Code lists those provisions which will be held not to render the sum
uncertain, and the wording of the comment to that section indicates
that a price-mdex clause would render a promissory note non-nego-
tiable within the Code. It states that in order for a sum certain to
exist, the computation to determine it "must be one which can be
5i Text at notes 30 and 31 supra.
5
2 BRnroN, Bzrs AND NoTms 81 (2d ed. 1961); NusSBAUTM, MONEY IN THE LAw
NATONAL AND INTERNATiONAL 308 (rev. ed. 1950); Call, Money and the Sliding Scale
Clause in Contracts, 24 Mo. L. REv. 44, 49 (1959); Dawson & Coultrap, Contracting by
Reference to Price Indices, 33 Micn. L. REv. 685, 698 (1935); Nebolsme, The Gold
Clause in Private Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 1051, 1093 (1933); Nussbaum, Multiple
Currency and Index Clauses, 84 U. PA. L. BV. 569, 594 (1936); Sims, Currency and
Sliding Scale Clauses in Contracts, 15 ALA. LAw. 5, 17 (1954).
53 NussBAzTJM, MoNEY iN =um LAw NATIONAL AND INR=NATiONAL 252 (rev. ed.
1950).
54 Section 3-104(1) provides: "Any writing to be a negotiable instrument within
this Article must (b) contain an unconditional promise or order to pay a sum
certain in money
5 Section 3-106(1) provides: "The sum payable is a sum certain even though it
is to be paid (a) with stated interest or by stated installments; or (b) with stated
different rates of interest before and after default or a specified date; or (c) with a
stated discount or addition if paid before or after the date fixed for payment; or (d)
with exchange or less exchange, whether at a fixed rate or at the current rate; or (e)
with costs of collection or an attorney's fee or both upon default."
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made from the instrument itself without reference to any outside
s o u r c e 
"56
Despite section 3-106, section 3-104 does make it possible for
some writings to be made negotiable by other statutes or by judicial
decisions.57 Thus the door would be open for a new type of commer-
cial paper which might develop in the future, such as price-index
clause obligations. It would appear that there is little reason for an
index clause to be held to affect negotiability by a court acting outside
the scope of the Code. The requirements in form for negotiability are
intended to protect the holder and insure transferability in the com-
mercial market. The primary test should be whether or not a dis-
puted provision in an otherwise negotiable instrument will derogate
from the aggregate of rights which the holder is receiving. 8 If an
index clause obligation contains a mmimum face value provision 9
the holder will not have any risk of a reduction m the amount due;
an index provision can only enhance the position of the holder.
The clearest analogy is to instruments payable in foreign currency
Such an instrument is declared by the Code to be a promise to pay a
sum certain in money 60 If the instrument does not otherwise specify,
it may be satisfied by payment in the number of dollars that the
foreign currency would purchase at the buying sight rate on the date
of maturity or demand."i It will be noted that the actual amount due
cannot be determined until maturity or demand, and even at that
time cannot be determined from the face of the istrument. One
writer states the policy behind tins section as follows:
It is absolutely imperative of course, that a negotiable instrument
be certain and definite as to amount payable, but this does not mean
56 UJoom CoMmacYAL CODE § 3-106, comment 1. This comment appears to be
ained at interest provisions stated "at the current rate" but the policy would seem
equally applicable to an index clause obligation.
57 The language is, "to be a negotiable instrument within this Article "Comment
1 to § 3-104 states: "'within this Article in subsection (1) leaves open the possibility
that some writings may be made negotiable by other statutes or ]udicial decisions. The
same is true as to any new type of paper which commercial practice may develop
in the future."
58 Compare Citizens State Bank v. Pauly, 152 Kan. 152, 102 P.2d 966 (1940), where
the court stated that the "primary test to be applied in determining whether a disputed
provision renders the amount that will be due on the note uncertain and therefore
destroy [scl] negotiability, is whether the provision leaves a possibility of reduction in
the amount collectible on the note. 'Certainty of amount' is not affected if the provision
gives the maker no opportunity of reducing his note obligation." Id. at 157, 102 P.2d
at 969.
59 Both the Utility Trailer and Christiansen instruments provide that the principal
obligation cannot drop below 100%.
60 UNw o m Comasscmm CoDE § 3-107(2).
61 Ibid.
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that the purchase power of the instrument as of the date of its
maturity must be ascertainable in advance. The purchase power of
all money, foreign and domestic, is constantly varying, and one who
exchanges property for money or the promise of money necessarily
runs the risk that the future exchange value of the property will be
less or greater than the future exchange value of the money 
62
Although the nominal foreign sum on the face of such an instrument
is certain, the amount of United States currency necessary to dis-
charge the obligation will be uncertain until maturity In both opera-
tion and effect, a provision for payment in foreign currency is very
similar to a prce-mdex clause. In both types of obligations the amount
due is unascertamable until maturity, but is capable of ascertainment
by reference to an extrinsic source at any given time during the term
of the obligation.(3 Similarly, a foreign money clause could be used
in certain situations to act exactly as does an index clause. Suppose,
for example, there was a heavy inflation in the United States but not
m Great Britain. If a United States citizen loaned money to a
British citizen under such circumstances with the obligation being
expressed in pounds sterling, the investment would be secure against
depreciation in United States currency because the buying sight rate
would reflect the changed economic situation. To tins extent, the com-
mercial certainty of an index clause obligation is no less than that of a
foreign money obligation.
Negotiability Under Article 8 of the Uniform
Commercial Code
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code deals with investment
securities. Section 8-102(1) (a) provides that:
a security is an instrument which (i) is issued in bearer or registered
form; and (ii) is of a type commonly dealt in upon securities ex-
changes or markets or commonly recognized in any area in wnch it
is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment; and (iii) is either
one of a class or series or by its terms is divisible into a class or
series of instruments; and (iv) evidences a share, participation or
other interest in property or in an enterprise or evidences an obliga-
tion of the issuer.64
6 2 HAwELAND, CommmcaCr. PAPER 12 (1959).
63 It was the fact of ascertamnability that led to judicial decisions upholding the
negotiability of instruments providing for exchange. E.g., Whittle v. Fond du Lac Natl
Bank, 26 S.W 1106 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894); DA~inL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENrS § 54
(6th ed. Calvert 1913). The UNoRm NEGoTBLr INsTrumEr LAw § 2(4) and
UNwoRm CommmciAL CODE § 3-106(1)d allow a negotiable instrument to contain a
provision for exchange.
64 This is declared by the comment to § 8-102 to be a functional definition of a
May, 1967] COMMENTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
If an instrument fits within the above definition of a security, Article
3 of the Code will not apply 65
If properly drafted, either a price-index clause bond or promis-
sory note66 issued by a corporation could easily fit all of the require-
ments of Article 8 mentioned above except for (ii) The problem is
in determining when an instrument becomes one "commonly dealt
in." It is clear that the holder of a new type of instrument would not
have Article 8 protection until enough time had elapsed for the
instrument to become commonly recognized in investment circles.67
Despite several broad generalizations as to the use of such clauses in
corporation bonds,68 this writer has been unable to uncover more
than two such instruments in present use.69 State,'70 and federal7'
agencies, as well as brokerage firms72 and others,73 have indicated
that few of these instruments exist. It would appear that such istrau-
ments are either almost nonexistent, or are used solely in close corpora-
security. It is so broad a definition that the New York Law Revision Commission has
suggested that even theater tickets might technically fit within it. 3 1955 NEw YoRK
LAw RBvisiox ComikssxoN REPORT 1889.
65 UNIFoiu Comi.RcAL. CoDE § 8-102(1)b.
66 Promissory notes issued in a series are recognized as a medium of investment and
if in bearer or registered form could come under Article 8 even though normally treated
as commercial paper. 3 1955 NEw YoRK LAw PEVwION Cowi'mssIoN REPORT 1884.
67 Id. at 1883.
18 Note 14 supra.
69 The two instruments are the Utility Trailer note and the Christiansen debenture,
discussed supra.7o Although most state officials contacted indicated that they had no available infor-
mation on such instruments, the following indicated that they had no recollection of an
inflation provision instrument ever crossing their desks: Letter From N. J. Kiraly,
Deputy Commissioner of Securities, Ohio, to the Author, Dec. 6, 1966; Letter From
John F Huem, Corporation and Securities Bureau, Michigan, to the Author, Dec. 9,
1966; Letter From Truman G. Holladay, Deputy Commissioner, State Securities Board,
Texas, to the Author, Dec. 7, 1966.71 Letter From George P. Michaely, Jr., Division of Corporation Finance, SEC, to
the Author, Dec. 13, 1966, stating that records of recent filings do not show any such
instruments. The only such instrument in Bureau of Labor Statistics files is the Christian-
sen debenture. Letter From Arnold E. Chase, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, to the Author, Dec. 19, 1966.
72 The following stockbrokers and bondbrokers indicated that they had never seen
such an instrumnent: Letter From William H. Hastings, Dean Witter & Co., New York, to
the Author, Dec. 21, 1966; Letter From Edward N. Giobbe, Dempsey-Tegeler & Co.,
New York, to the Author, Dec. 22, 1966; Letter From Charles B. Kane, Mitchum,
Jones & Templeton, San Francisco, to the Author, Dec. 14, 1966; Telephone Conversation
With Thomas Uhry, E. F Hutton & Co., San Francisco, Dec. 12, 1966.
7 3 Mr. John E. Walker, Research Director for the Investment Bankers Association of
America, states that the Association is "slightly familiar" with this type of financing in
corporate and mumcipal bonds but is not aware of individual instances of such use.
Letter From John E. Walker to the Author, Dec. 13, 1966.
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tions for private issue. The anomaly is that until the instruments are
in common usage they will not be negotiable, but until they are
negotiable they are a poor investment. The Code does not define the
terms "commonly dealt in" or commonly recognized," so that the
decision will be placed in the hands of the courts. If inflation con-
tinues, necessity may require that such clauses be inserted in bonds in
order to make them more attractive to investors. The result of a
sufficient issue of such instruments to make them "commonly dealt in"
would be to accord them Article 8 protection.
Tax Problems
There are two clear federal income tax problems raised by the use
of index clause obligations. The first involves the status of bookkeep-
ing adjustments for the increased "prepayment value" of the loan as
accrued interest or discount expense under Internal Revenue Code of
1954, section 163(a). The second involves the taxability of the obligee
for the amount received on retirement or sale of the obligation which
represents the increase in the price-index during the term of the
obligation.
Any accounting method 74 used by a corporation employing index
clause obligations would indicate annual adjustments for changes in
the actual value of the outstanding instruments. In Utility Trailer
Mfg. Co. v. United States75 the taxpayer contended that the book
changes for each year on such an obligation constituted interest or
discount expense under section 163(a) 76 and should therefore be
deductible for income tax purposes. The court first held that the infla-
tion provision notes constituted a debt obligation rather than a risk
investment 7 7 and that the alleged "cost-of-loan" expense would be
deductible if accrued. But the court found that the payment of the
increased amount was contingent upon a continued inflationary cycle
winch could reverse itself, and thereby eliminate the claimed ex-
pense. 8 Therefore the amount had not accrued and could not be
deducted under section 163(a) 79 Thus the taxpayer was allowed to
74 There are cursory treatments of the accounting problems created by these bonds
m Dawson & Coultrap, supra note 52, at 699; Nebolsme, supra note 52, at 1093.
75 212 F Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
7 8 Section 163(a) provides: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest
paid or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."
77 212 F Supp. at 791. This is important because there is no deduction allowed for
amounts paid on capital or surplus invested in the business which do not represent
charges arising under an interest-bearing obligation. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-1(c) (1966).
78 212 F Supp. at 793.
79 Ibtd.
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deduct interest actually paid but was required to carry the increased
obligation upon its books without a commensurate reduction in -
come tax liability
It also appears that the obligee of such an mstrument would be
taxed for the increased principal which he receives. The United States
has successfully advanced the nominalistic theory of money80 in a case
where the taxpayer contended that purchasing power (value) is the
proper measure for determining capital gains rather than the nominal
amount. In Bates v. United States,81 the taxpayer had purchased
securities prior to the 1934 devaluation and sold them afterwards in
a higher market. He objected to the assessment for capital gains on
the ground that his nominal gain was financially nonexistent because
of the devaluation of the dollar. The court ruled that purchasing
power was irrelevant in a nominalistic system and held him liable for
the tax, using the following language: "The standard unit of computa-
tion is the money dollar, an abstract or ideal unit of account. This
standard unit of money has not changed in money value throughout
the existence of our monetary system."8" It would seem to follow that
the holder of an index clause obligation could not resist the tax upon
his nominal gain.
There is the further related question, however, of whether the
Internal Revenue Service could classify the increased principal as
straight income rather than a capital gain. Under section 1232 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the part of the gain which represents
an "original issue discount" will be taxed as ordinary income. An
original issue discount is the difference between the "issue price"
and the "stated redemption price at maturity "3 The stated redemp-
tion price at maturity means the amount fixed by the last modification
of the purchase agreement.84 The issue price is the price paid by the
first buyer of the obligation.8 5
It is apparent that the Utility Trailer and Christiansen obligations
fall into an area left uncovered by the statute. If the changes wrought
by an increased cost-of-living can be considered a "modification of
the purchase agreement," then the last such change before maturity
would give the stated redemption price at maturity The issue price
must be construed to be the actual consideration paid because of
money nominalism. The difference between the two amounts would
80 Note 10 supra.
81108 F.2d 407 (7th Cir. 1939), cert. dened, 309 U.S. 666 (1940).
82 Id. at 408.
83 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1232(b)1.
84 bd.
85 INr. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1232(b)2.
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be the original issue discount. The logical probability is that the in-
crement would be considered capital appreciation and therefore
eligible for capital gains treatment. Note, however, the anomalous
position of the Internal Revenue Service in preparing for litigation
against both the obligor and the obligee. In the former suit the tax-
payer will contend that the increment is interest or discount expense
under section 163(a) and should be deductible. 6 The obligee, how-
ever, must raise the opposite plea: that this is not discount expense
under section 1232, but capital appreciation.
Usury
In discussing index clause obligations with attorneys, the first
question has invariably been, "What about usury?" The answer to
this appears simple at first glance: the increment is not interest. The
problem arises in reconciling the language of the cases with the
terms of an index clause instrument. The contention of usury could
be raised on two grounds: 1) that the increase in principal is interest;
and 2) that the interest, as computed upon the increased value, ex-
ceeds the maximum allowable percentage of the face amount of the
mstrument. If the increment is held not to be interest, the second
contention should also fail because the obligee is merely taking a
legal percentage of actual principal.
It should first be noted that only a few states protect corporations
from usury 87 In the majority of states therefore, the question would
not arise in regard to a corporate obligataon. 8
Usury is usually defined as the loan or forbearance of money pay-
able absolutely at a charge in excess of the interest allowed by law 8 9
A loan has been defined as a contract by which one delivers a sum
of money to another, and the latter agrees to return at a future time
an equwalent sum to that which he borrowed. 0 Interest is that which
8 This contention was rejected m Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v. United States, 212 F
Supp. 773 (S.D. Cal. 1962).
87 In California a corporation can plead usury as a defense to a contract. CAL. GEN.
LAws AiN. act 3757, § 3 (Deering 1954) (also printed as CAL. Civ. CoD. § 1916-3).
But see, In the Matter of Washer, 200 Cal. 598, 254 Pac. 951 (1927). In the following
states a corporation may plead usury under certain statutory restrictions: Arizona, Florida,
Kentucky, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota. 1 P-H
1966 INsTALLm mT AN CoNIrnoNAL SALES fl 15, 911-61.
88 Katz, Usury Laws and the Corporate Exception, 23 MD. L. REV. 51, 54 (1963)
(lists jurisdictions which by statute exclude a corporation from defense of usury).
s9 E.g., Allen v. Newton, 219 Mo. App. 74, 266 S.W 327 (1924).
90 CAL. Civ. CODE § 1912; Milana v. Credit Discount Co., 27 Cal. 2d 335, 339-40,
163 P.2d 869, 871 (1945); Barnes v. Hartman, 246 A.C.A. 266, 272, 54 Cal. Rptr. 514,
518 (1966).
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is compensation for the use or forbearance of money which exceeds
the sum loaned.9 1 The problem arises in determining whether a "sum"
is intrinsically nominal in its terms, or whether it can represent value.
Clearly the increase is not a profit in terms of value. 2 Under a statute
reading "any greater sum or any greater value for the loan or forbear-
ance of money"93 the increment would seem to be valid. The increased
principal can only be considered compensation for a loan if the court
applies the nominalistic theory of money.
There are several classes of usury cases which might be considered
analogous to the index clause obligation. The first class involves the
prediscount transaction. When the lender deducts an amount of
money from the loan, so that the actual amount of money handed
over to the borrower is less than that expressed on the face of the
note, the transaction is prima facie usurious.94 A court could construe
an index clause obligation as falling within this class by holding that
the difference between the amount loaned and that required to be
repaid is a discount. -
There is another group of cases which exempts from the operation
of the usury statute, obligations which allow for contingent interest
payments above the legal rate. If the payment of the full legal
interest is subject to a contingency so that the lender's profit is wholly
or partially put in hazard, the interest thus contingently payable
need not be limited to the legal rate, provided that the parties are
contracting in good faith and without the intent to evade the usury
law 95 This exception is tempered by the restriction that if the parties
expect that the contingency will occur placing the total well over
the maximum allowable interest, the intention to evade the usury
9 1 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 1915 defines interest as "the compensation allowed by law or
fixed by the parties for the use, or forbearance, or detention of money."
9 2
RESTATEmENT, CoNmTAcTs § 527, at 1025 (1932) uses the term "profit" mn dis-
cussing the exaction of interest, rather than the terms sum or value.
93 CAL. GEx. LAws Atm. act 3757, § 2 (Deenng 1954) (also printed as CAL. Civ.
CODE § 1916-2). CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 provides m part: "No person shall by
charging any fee, bonus, commission, discount or other compensation receive from a
borrower more than 10 percent per annum upon any loan or forbearance of any money,
goods or things in action." Where the Constitution is inconsistent with the Usury Law,
it supersedes it. CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22. The term "any greater sum or any greater
value" found mn the Usury Law may be inconsistent with the Constitutional provision
above. If so, the Califorma courts could require nominalistic equivalence in repayment.
94 E.g., Devers v. Greenwood, 139 Cal. App. 2d 345, 293 P.2d 834 (1956); Richlin
v. Schlenner, 120 Cal. App. 40, 7 P.2d 711 (1932); Henning v. Akin, 91 Cal. App. 246,
266 Pac. 981 (1928).
95 E.g., Miley Petroleum Corp. v. Amerada Petroleum Corp., 18 Cal. App. 2d 182,
63 P.2d 1210 (1936).
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law will be found despite the fact that such interest was subject to
a contingency."
There is a further exception to the usury law where the principal
sum is subject to hazards and the repayment of the loan is subject
in whole or in part to some contingency 17 Thus, if an index clause
instrument did not provide for a nummum maturity value of 100%,
so that the principal sum would become subject to deflation, the usury
law would not come into operation.
In the middle nineteenth century there were usury cases involving
the loan of depreciated currency with a promise to make repayment
in currency of a greater value with interest. The cases split on the
issue of usury in this situation, most turning on the question of
intent.98 The cases are distinguishable from the present discussion
because they involved the loan of one kind of money for repayment
in another. Therefore, where the repayment was to be at par, the
lender was not, as in the case of an index clause, preserving the
value of the loan at the time made, but was extracting interest at a
higher level than allowed by law In one case the court held that
where a party receives depreciated bank notes in payment and gives
receipts for their nominal value, it is not a usurious transaction unless
the real value of the banknotes exceeds the sum really due.99 This
case relied upon a comparison between the value loaned and the
value to be repaid. An index clause would be valid under such a test
because the value loaned and the value repaid are identical.
Finally, there were several cases involving gold clauses and usury
contentions. 100 In one such case the borrower received $4,000 in paper
money and promised to repay $4,000 in gold corn, or its equivalent
value in current money at maturity 101 The court held that this was
not usurious per se, and affirmed a verdict for the obligee because of
the absence of proof of usurious intent. This case could be good
authority for either the plaintiff or defendant in a usury suit in-
volving a price-index clause, depending upon whether or not usurious
intent is proven.
9OJameson v. Warren, 91 Cal. App. 590, 267 Pac. 372 (1928); cf. REsTATEmNT,
CoiNnRcTs § 527, comment a (1932).
97Ambrose v. Alioto, 65 Cal. App. 2d 365, 150 P.2d 502 (1944); RESTATEMENT,
CoNTa&crs § 527 (1932).
98 Bank of the United States v. Waggener, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 378 (1835); Helm
v. Jessie, 28 Ky. 428 (1831); Burnham & Co. v. Gentrys, 23 Ky. 354 (1828); Caton v.
Shaw, 2 Har. & G. 13 (Md. 1827); Pratt v. Adams, 7 Paige 615 (N.Y. 1839). But see,
Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 527 (1829).
99 Helm v. Jessie, supra note 98.
100 Stark v. Coffin, 105 Mass. 328 (1870); cf. Rhodes v. Fullenwider, 25 N.C. 415
(1843).
101 Stark v. Coffin, supra note 100.
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Conclusion
The most interesting thing about these clauses is the variety of
questions which they raise and the anomalous treatment they may
receive in litigation involving different issues, especially the question
of whether the increment is capital or interest. These instruments
could be very useful to an investor during an inflationary period.
The main reasons for their lack of attractiveness to the investor have
been unfamiliarity and lack of negotiability Both of these problems
are intricately interrelated; the instruments will be negotiable securi-
ties under Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code if they come
into general usage. Practical problems of accounting and tax treat-
ment remain to be solved. Protection against too great an increase
in the obligation will have to be provided by the obligee. There will
remain the possibility that the clauses may be struck down as usurious
or as a violation of the public policy stated in the 1933 Joint Resolu-
tion. They are, however, a desirable innovation to protect the investor
against inflation, and would be looked upon with favor by the public
and by brokers adequately acquainted with their function. The prob-
lems involved could be solved by statute or judicial decision, if and
when price-index clause obligations come into general use. The latter





Chnstiansen Plan-Inflation Provision Debenture
Due July 1, 1972
Chicago, Illinois
July 1, 1952
§ 1.1. CmusrA~sE ColxoiAnrIoN, a Delaware corporation (here-
mafter called "the Company"), for value received hereby promises to pay
to the registered holder, on July 1, 1972, in such corn or currency of the
United States of America as at the time of payment shall be legal tender
for the payment of public and private debts, at its principal office in the City
of Chicago and State of Illinois a sum of money (hereinafter called the
"Maturity Value") the amount of which is to be determined in accordance
with the provisions of section 1.2 of this Debenture, together with interest
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from the date hereof payable to the registered holder of this Debenture at
the said principal office of the Company on January 1 and July 1 of each
year, such interest payments to be calculated at a rate of 4,% per annum
on a sum of money (hereinafter called the "Prepayment Value") the
amount of which is to be determined in accordance with the provisions of
section 1.2 of this Debenture.
This Debenture is being issued m the sum of $ (here-
mafter called the "Face Amount").
§ 1.2. Since it is the purpose of the Company to pay to the holder of
this Debenture at maturity, or any prior date of payment, and to pay in-
terest on, an amount in dollars equivalent to the purchasing power of
the Face Amount on June 15, 1952, such payments of principal and
interest shall be made in amounts which will provide within the limits
expressed below for changes in the purchasing power of the Face Amount
due to price changes as measured by changes in the "Consumer's Price
Index for Moderate Income Families in Large Cities-Combined Adjusted
Series" (all Items), which index is now being published monthly in the
"Monthly Labor Review" of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United
States Department of Labor and is hereinafter referred to as the "BLS
Consumers' Price Index As used in this Debenture "Base Index" shall
mean the index number for all items of the BLS Consumers' Price Index
published by the aforesaid Bureau of Labor Statistics as the final official
index number for June 15, 1952. "Index Number" shall mean the final
official index number for all items of the BLS Consumers' Price Index
as published at any specified date by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
(a) The Maturity Value of this Debenture shall be at least 100%
of the Face Amount and not more than 150% of the Face Amount. With-
in these limits the Maturity Value shall be determined by multiplying the
Face Amount by a factor obtained by dividing the Index Number for
January 15, 1972, by the Base Index, such factor to be determined to the
nearest one-hundredth.
(b) The Prepayment Value of this Debenture shall be at least 100%
of the Face Amount and not more than 150% of the Face Amount. With-
in these limits the Prepayment Value shall be determined semiannually
as of January 15 and July 15 of each year by multiplying the Face
Amount by a factor obtained by dividing the Index Number for January
15 and July 15 respectively by the Base Index, such factor to be deter-
mined to the nearest one-hundredth. The Prepayment Value as deter-
nuned from the Index Number for January 15 of each year shall, for
all purposes including, without limitation, the payment of interest, be
considered the Prepayment Value of this Debenture from March 15 to
and including September 14 of such year. The Prepayment Value as deter-
mined from the Index Number for July 15 of each year shall for all pur-
poses, including, without limitation, the payment of interest, be considered
the Prepayment Value of this Debenture from September 15 of such year
to and including March 14 of the year succeeding such July 15.
(c) It is recogmzed that the base period of the BLS Consumers'
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Price Index may be changed from time to time and that such changes
may result in the publication of Index Numbers not directly comparable
with the Base Index as defined above. In the event of any such change in
the BLS Consumers' Price Index, Maturity Value and Prepayment Value
shall be deterined in accordance with the following provisions in order
to utilize the Index Numbers which will be published:
(1) As used in this Debenture
(i) "New Index" means any index published regularly by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, its successor agency or other United
States governmental organization which is designed to reflect changes
in the cost of living to consumers due to price changes. In the event
that more than one index is published by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, its successor agency or other United States governmental
organization, which indices are designed to reflect changes in the
cost of living to consumers due to price changes, the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, its successor agency, or other United States govern-
mental organization, shall be requested to certify to the Company
which published index is most comprehensive in coverage and most
nearly comparable with the BLS Consumers' Price Index. The index
so certified shall be considered the "New Index" for purposes of
this Debenture and such certification shall be final and binding on
the Company and the registered holder of this Debenture. In the
event that the Bureau of Labor Statistics, its successor agency, or
other United States governmental organization refuses to certify to
the Company which published index is most comprehensive n
coverage and most nearly comparable with the BLS Consumers'
Price Index, the Company and the registered holder of this Deben-
ture agree that a third party shall be appointed by American National
Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, a national banking associa-
tion, now located at 33 North La Salle Street, Chicago, Illinois, who
shall certify as to what published index is most comprehensive in
coverage and most nearly comparable with the BLS Consumers'
Price Index. The index so certified shall then be considered the
"New Index" for purposes of this Debenture and such certification
shall be final and binding on the Company and the registered holder
of this Debenture.
(ii) "New Index Number" means any index number published
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics or its successor agency or other
United States governmental organization in the "New Index"
(iii) "Revised Base Index" means the number found in accord-
ance with the provisions of this section 1.2(c) which will be com-
parable with the New Index Number.
(2) At the time the New Index becomes effective the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, its successor agency, or other United States govern-
mental organization publishing the New Index shall be requested to
supply a conversion factor by means of which the Base Index may be
redetermined on a basis comparable with the New Index Numbers. The
finding of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, its successor agency, or other
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18
United States governmental organization with respect to tis conversion
factor shall be final and binding upon the Company and the registered
holder of this Debenture. The number obtained by applying the conver-
sion factor to the Base Index (obtained to the nearest one-hundredth)
shall be the Revised Base Index.
(3) In the event that the Bureau of Labor Statistics, its successor
agency, or other United States governmental organization publishing
the New Index is unable or refuses to supply a conversion factor, the
Revised Base Index shall be determined by multiplying the Base Index
by a factor obtained by dividing the New Index Number published for
the last month that the old index number is official by the old index
number for the last month in which the old index number is official.
In the event that a New Index Number is not published for the last
month in which the old index number is official, the Revised Base Index
shall be determined by multiplying the Base Index by a factor obtained
by dividing the New Index Number first published by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics, its successor agency, or other United States govern-
mental organization publishing the New Index by the last index num-
ber published by any of the aforesaid organizations prior to the change.
(4) Maturity Value and Prepayment Value will be determined
as of the dates and as described in sections 1.2(a) and 1.2(b) substitut-
ing the Revised Base Index for the Base Index and the New Index
Number for the Index Number.
(d) Changes in the name, methods of compilation, publication, or
United States governmental agency directing the publication of the BLS
Consumers' Price Index or any New Index as determined by section
1.2(c) (1) (1) other than changes in the base period or other changes here-
in provided for shall in no way affect the obligations of tls Debenture
or the methods of determining Prepayment Value and Maturity Value as
described in this section 1.2.
(e) In the event that dunng the term of this Debenture the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, its successor agency, or other United States govern-
mental organization ceases to publish an index designed to reflect changes
in the cost of living to consumers due to price changes, the Maturity Value
and Prepayment Value of this Debenture shall be determined in accord-
ance with the provisions of fis section 1.2 for the last date of publication
of BLS Consumers' Price Index or New Index. Such Maturity Value and
Prepayment Value as determined of that date shall remain unchanged for
the duration of the term of this Debenture.
Appendix B
Suppose, for example, that X Corporation issues a ten year bond on
January 1, 1967, for $100.00 at six per cent per annum interest, and suppose
that the Consumer Price Index on the applicable date is 90. If the interest
computations were to be made as of December 1 of each year, the following
chart might represent the transaction over a ten year period.
May, 1967] COMMENTS
























1.11 X $100 = $110
1.17 x 100= 117
ndex Factor
100 100 = 1.1190
105 105 = 1.17
90
108 108 = 1.20
90
107 10-7 = 1.1890
113 113 = 1.25
90
115 1 1 2
120 120 = 1.339
128 128 = 1.4290
135 035 = 1.50
90








1.55 X 100= 155
The maturity value will be the same as the last prepayment value, $155.00.
Interest
Due
$6.60
7.02
7.20
7.08
7.50
7.68
7.98
8.52
9.00
1.20 X
1.18 X
1.25 X
1.28 X
1.33 X
1.42 x
1.50 X
